Lechfeldi csata

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Lechfeldi csata — Węgierskie najazdy na Europę — Plik:Basilica di aquilieia, cripta, affreschi registro inferiore 03.JPG Czas 12 czerwca 910 Miejsce Lechowe Pole, obok Augsburga, Bawaria Wynik Miażdżące zwycięstwo Węgier Strony konfliktu Państwo wschodniofrankijskie, Szwabia Księstwo Wegier Dowódcy Louis the Child Count Gozbert of Alemannia (the real commander of the army)Szablon:KIA Managolt, count of AlemanniaSzablon:KIA Nieznany dowódca węgierski Siły Nieznane 5.000÷7.000 Straty Ciężkie, wśród nich hrabia Gozbert i Managolt, hrabia Alemannia Lekkie — {{{notes}}} — Bitwa pod Lechfeld w 910 roku była ważnym zwycięstwem armii Madziarów nad zjednoczoną armią cesarską Ludwika Dziecka. [1] [2] Położone na południe od Augsburga Lechfeld to równina zalewowa nad rzeką Lech. W tym czasie Wielkim Księciem Węgier był Zolta, Węgier Zoltán, ale nie ma wzmianki o tym, że brał udział w bitwie. The Battle of Lechfeld in 910, was an important victory by a Magyar army over Louis the Child's united Frankish Imperial Army. Located south of Augsburg, the Lechfeld is the flood plain that lies along the Lech River. At this time the Grand Prince of Hungary was Zolta, Zoltán of Hungary, but there is no record of him taking part in the battle. Ta bitwa jest jednym z najwspanialszych przykładów sukcesu słynnej taktyki udawanego odwrotu stosowanej przez wędrownych wojowników oraz przykładem tego, jak skutecznie można wykorzystać wojnę psychologiczną. This battle is one of the greatest examples of the success of the famous feigned retreat tactic used by nomadic warriors, and an example of how psychological warfare can be used effectively. Bitwa pojawia się jako pierwsza bitwa pod Augsburgiem [3] w węgierskiej historiografii. The battle appears as the first Battle of Augsburg in Hungarian historiography. Sources Źródła obejmują Antapodosis, seu rerum per Europam gestarum, napisane przez Liutpranda z Cremony, [4] Continuator Reginonis, Annales Alamannici, [5] Necrologies of niemieckich hrabiów (Gozbert i Managolt), zabitych w tej bitwie. Bardzo ważnym źródłem tej bitwy jest również kronika o nazwie Annalium Boiorum VII, napisana w XVI wieku przez bawarskiego humanistę Johannesa Aventinusa, ponieważ szczegółowo opisuje pierwszą bitwę pod Augsburgiem, opierając się na starych źródłach, które dziś zaginęły. . Jednak popełnia błędy, umieszczając tę ​​bitwę w 907 r., Szybko po bitwie pod Pressburgiem, jej miejsce pod Ennsburgiem w Bawarii, i zamiast Szwabów wymienia Bawarczyków jako jej uczestników. Sources include Antapodosis, seu rerum per Europam gestarum, written by Liutprand of Cremona, Continuator Reginonis, Annales Alamannici, Necrologies of the German counts (Gozbert and Managolt), killed in this battle. The chronicle named Annalium Boiorum VII, written in the 16th century by the Bavarian humanist Johannes Aventinus is also a very important source of this battle, because it narrates in a detailed way the first battle of Augsburg, relying on old sources, which today are lost. However he makes some mistakes by putting this battle in 907, quickly after the Battle of Pressburg, its place at Ennsburg in Bavaria, and instead of Swabians, names the Bavarians as its participants. Lokalizacja i data Większość historyków przyjmuje datę i miejsce bitwy podane przez Liutpranda pod Cremoną jako 910 i Augsburg. odpowiednio. Chociaż dzieło Liutpranda z Cremony Antapodosis powstało w latach pięćdziesiątych XX wieku, a więc zaledwie kilkadziesiąt lat po wydarzeniach, węgierski historyk Torma Béla uważa, że ​​to nie on, a pisarz w XVI wieku Aventinus miał rację, stawiając bitwę, przedstawia szczegółowo, w 907 r., w Ennsburgu, a nie w Augsburgu, jak wskazuje Liutprand. [7] Reprezentuje jednak odmienne zdanie innych historyków, którzy uważają, że informacje współczesnego Liutpranda są słuszne. The majority of the historians accept the date and place of the battle given by Liutprand of Cremona as 910 and Augsburg. respectively. Although Liutprand of Cremona's work Antapodosis was written in the 950s, so only a few decades after the events, the Hungarian historian Torma Béla believes that not him, but Aventinus, who wrote in the XVI. century, was right when he put the battle which he presents in detail, in 907 and at Ennsburg and not Augsburg, as Liutprand points. However, he represents a dissenting opinion from the other historians, who believe that the contemporary Liutprand's information is right. Tło Ta bitwa była częścią wojny w Kotlinie Karpackiej między nowo zasiedlonymi Węgrami a wschodnim królestwem Franków, która trwała od 900 roku, podbicia Zadunajów przez Węgrów z Bawarii i 910 roku, bitwy pod Rednitz. Po bitwie pod Pressburgiem Węgrzy kontynuowali kampanie przeciwko Francji Wschodniej w celu całkowitego podporządkowania sobie Niemców pokonanych w 907 r. W 908 r. Armia węgierska najechała Turyngię, zabijając w bitwie pod Eisenach swojego księcia Burcharda, księcia Egino i Rudolf I, biskup Würzburga. W 909 r. Wojska węgierskie najechały Bawarię, ale została pokonana przez księcia Bawarii Arnulfa w niewielkiej bitwie pod Pocking. This battle was part of the war in the Carpathian Basin between the newly settled Hungarians and the East Frankish kingdom, which lasted between 900, the conqering of Transdanubia by the Hungarians from the Bavarians, and 910, the Battle of Rednitz. After the Battle of Pressburg, the Hungarians continued their campaigns against East Francia, in order to subdue completely the Germans, beaten in 907. In 908 a Hungarian army invaded Thuringia, killing in the Battle of Eisenach its duke, Burchard, Duke Egino, and Rudolf I, Bishop of Würzburg. In 909 a Hungarian army invaded Bavaria, but it was defeated by Arnulf, Duke of Bavaria in a minor battle near Pocking. Preludium Prawdopodobnie pragnąc powtórzyć zwycięskie kampanie swojego przodka Karola Wielkiego przeciwko Awarom, które zakończyły się podbiciem tych ostatnich (choć nie pamiętał o losie Luitpolda w bitwie pod Pressburgiem trzy lata wcześniej), król Ludwik Dzieciątko zdecydował, że siły z wszystkie księstwa niemieckie powinny się zjednoczyć, by walczyć z Węgrami. Groził nawet egzekucją tych, którzy nie zbiorą się pod jego flagą. [8] Możemy więc przypuszczać, że Louis zgromadził „ogromną armię”, jak to określił Liutprand w swoim Antapodosis. [9] Nie znamy dokładnej liczby, ale można przypuszczać, że była ona znacznie liczniejsza niż wojska węgierskie, co tłumaczy, dlaczego Madziarowie byli tak ostrożni podczas bitwy i czekali niezwykle długo (ponad dwanaście godzin), podlewając siłę wroga krok po kroku dzięki taktyce uderz i uciekaj, a także stosując metody psychologiczne, aby zmylić ich, zanim podejmiesz decydujący krok taktyczny. Possibly desirous of repeating the victorious campaigns of his ancestor Charles the Great against the Avars which ended with the subjugation of the latter (though unmindful of the fate of Luitpold in the Battle of Pressburg three years earlier), King Louis the Child decided that forces from all the German duchies should come together to fight the Hungarians. He even threatened with execution those who would not gather under his flag. So we can presume that Louis gathered a "huge army," as Liutprand terms it in his Antapodosis. We do not know its exact number, but it can be assumed that it was far more numerous than the Hungarian army, which explains why the Magyars were so cautious during the battle, and waited an unusually long time (more than twelve hours), sapping the strength of the enemy little by little with hit-and-run tactics, as well as using psychological methods to confuse them, before making the decisive tactical step. Historyk Igaz Levente mówi, że kampania węgierska z 910 r. Została rozpoczęta, aby zapobiec kolejnej kampanii niemieckiej przeciwko terytoriom węgierskim, jak ta z 907 r., Która zakończyła się klęską armii zachodniej w bitwie pod Pressburgiem. Chociaż było to miażdżące zwycięstwo Węgier, Madziarowie uważali, że bezpieczniej jest prowadzić operacje wojskowe w Niemczech niż na ich własnych ziemiach. [10] Ta węgierska kampania jest często cytowana jako wspaniały przykład strategii prewencyjnej wojny [11]. The historian Igaz Levente says that the Hungarian campaign of 910 was started in order to prevent another German campaign against the Hungarian territories like the one from 907, which ended in disaster for the Western army in the battle of Pressburg. Although it was a crushing Hungarian victory, the Magyars thought that it is safer to conduct military operations in Germany rather than in their own lands. This Hungarian campaign is often cited as a brilliant example of the preventive war strategy. Król i jego żołnierze przybyli w pobliże miasta Augsburga, na równiny Gunzenle, w pobliżu rzeki Lech, i czekali na pojawienie się armii frankońskiej dowodzonej przez Gebharda, księcia Lotaryngii, i przyłączenie się do nich przeciwko Węgrom. Na czele armii królewskiej stał hrabia Gozbert [12], ponieważ Ludwik Dzieciątko miał wtedy zaledwie 16 lat. [13] Nie wiemy, kto dowodził Węgrami, ponieważ Wielki Książę Węgrów w IX i X wieku nigdy nie brał udziału w bitwie poza terenami węgierskimi, a kampanie były prowadzone przez mniejszych dowódców wojskowych - być może gulów [ 14] horka lub jeden z książąt. [15] The king and his troops arrived near the city of Augsburg, on the plains of Gunzenle, near the Lech river, and waited for the Frankish army led by Gebhard, Duke of Lorraine to appear and join them against the Hungarians. The king's army was led by Count Gozbert, because Louis the Child was only 16 years old at the time. We do not know who led the Hungarians, inasmuch as the Grand Prince of the Hungarians in the ninth and tenth centuries never took part in a battle outside of the Hungarian territories, the campaigns being led by more minor military leaders—possibly the gyula, the horka or one of the princes. Węgrzy dowiedzieli się o planach Ludwika Dziecka i szybko wysłali armię węgierską, która rzuciła się, aby zapobiec połączeniu sił szwabskich i franko-lotarsko-bawarskich. Z dzieła Aventinus: Annalium Boiorum tom VII możemy zrekonstruować nawet ich trasę: po przekroczeniu Bawarii przez rzekę Enns dotarli do Augsburga przez Tegernsee, a następnie Sandau koło Landsberg am Lech. [16] Bardzo szybko dotarli do Augsburga w wymuszonym marszu, zupełnie nieoczekiwanym przez Ludwika Dziecka i jego armię. [17] Jest to kolejny dowód na niesamowitą skuteczność szpiegostwa ze względu na podkreślenie przez Księstwo Węgier i inne państwa wędrownych wojowników. [18] [19] Nieoczekiwane pojawienie się Węgrów przed bitwą pod Augsburgiem sprawia, że ​​trudno uwierzyć, że był to tylko zbieg okoliczności. Świadczy to o tym, że wywiad węgierski działał bardzo efektywnie nie tylko na Węgrzech, ale także na terytorium wroga, umożliwiając przeniesienie na jego ziemie miejsca działań wojennych. Jak wspomina Liutprand z Cremony, król nie spodziewał się, że Węgrzy tak szybko pojawią się na jego ziemiach. [20] Tak więc jego plany zjednoczenia wszystkich jego sił: głównie jego wojsk szwabskich i armii franko-lotarsko-bawarskiej, przed bitwą, nie powiodły się z powodu niezwykłego szpiegostwa koczowniczego państwa węgierskiego i znakomitej mobilności armii Madziarów, co umożliwiło aby oddzielnie pokonali te dwie armie. Podsumowując, można powiedzieć, że szpiedzy węgierscy dowiedzieli się o przygotowaniach wojsk niemieckich i tak szybko poinformowali dowódców Madziarów, że mieli czas zebrać armię i wkroczyć na terytorium Niemiec tak szybko, że Frankowie wschodni nie mieli czasu nie tylko na docierają do Węgier, ale nawet po to, by zakończyć koncentrację swoich wojsk i ruszyć w ich kierunku. Jednak z relacji Liutpranda z Cremony można zrozumieć, że nawet bez pomocy Franków armia królewska miała znacznie więcej żołnierzy niż Węgrzy. The Hungarians learned about the plans of Louis the Child, and quickly sent a Hungarian army, which rushed to prevent the joining of the Swabian and Frankish-Lotharingian-Bavarian forces. From the work of Aventinus: Annalium Boiorum volume VII, we can reconstruct even their route: after they had crossed Bavaria through the River Enns, they reached Augsburg through Tegernsee, then Sandau near to Landsberg am Lech. They reached Augsburg on forced march very quickly, totally unexpected by Louis the Child and his army. This is further proof of the incredible efficiency of espionage due to its emphasis by the Principality of Hungary and other states of the nomadic warriors. The unexpected appearance of the Hungarians before the battle of Augsburg makes it hard to believe that it was only a coincidence. This shows that the Hungarian intelligence worked very effectively not only in Hungary, but also in enemy territory, making possible the moving of the place of the military operations on his land. As Liutprand of Cremona mentions, the king did not expect that the Hungarians would appear in his land so quickly. So his plans of uniting all of his forces: his mostly Swabian troops and the Frankish-Lotharingian-Bavarian army, before the battle, failed because of the remarkable espionage of the nomadic Hungarian state and the superior mobility of the Magyar army, which made possible for them to defeat these two armies separately. In conclusion we can say that the Hungarian spies learned of the German armies preparations and informed the Magyar commanders so quickly, that these had the time to gather an army and move into the German territory so quickly that the Eastern Franks had no time not only to reach Hungary, but even to finish the concentration of their troops, and start to move towards it. Still, from the account of Liutprand of Cremona it can be understood that, even without the Frankish help, the king's army had many more soldiers than the Hungarians. Jeden z historyków przypuszcza, że ​​mała jednostka węgierska zajmowała się armią Franków aż do zakończenia bitwy pod Augsburgiem. Węgierscy koczowniczy wojownicy stosowali podobną taktykę gdzie indziej. Odwracali uwagę wrogów prostymi manewrami, aby ukryć prawdziwy ruch taktyczny i zamiary. Przykładem jest bitwa nad Brentą. [21] One historian supposes that a small Hungarian unit kept the Frankish Army busy until the Battle of Augsburg ended. Hungarian nomadic warriors used similar tactics elsewhere. They distracted enemies with simple maneuvers to hide the real tactical movement and intent. An example is the Battle of the Brenta. Bitwa On the dawn of 12 June 910, the Hungarian horsemen made a surprise attack, shooting arrows from a distance on the kings sleeping camp, killing many Germans with their arrows in their sleep, or quite after they woke up. But this attack was only a minor preparatory, so called swarming attack in order to diminish the fighting spirit of the Germans, after which they retreated to their camp. Plik:The first phase of the Battle of Lechfeld (910).jpg The first phase of the battle. The Germans prepared for battle, making their battle formation, and it began, with the Hungarians, probably in small swarming archer groups, attacking on horses, shooting arrows on the Germans, who protected themselves with their wall of shields. After a while the Hungarians retreated feigning defeat, and when the German heavy mounted horsemen pursued them, they shot arrows back on the Germans, killing many of them, while their horses continued to retreat. In the course of the day, this tactic was used several times. Probably the German army was composed of infantry and heavy cavalry, with heavy shields, lances, and swords, while the Hungarians were all light cavalry, with bow and arrow as their main weapon. This is why when the Germans attacked, only the heavy cavalry pursued the Hungarians, while the infantry formed a solid wall, and stayed in their places. Because of their light weapons and armor, Hungarians were more mobile and quick, but at the same time more vulnerable to the Germans' heavy weapons. But their nomadic composite bows were much more superior than the European bows, and because of this they could kill the enemy with their arrows, without being reached by the Europeans. Also the Hungarian horses were quicker than the German ones, because they had less weight to carry. But still, in order to lure the German soldiers after them, the Hungarians had to move very close, and even start short hand-to-hand skirmishes with the superior Germans, in the places of the defensive line, where they saw weaknesses, then to run, when the situation started to be severe, convincing the enemy that he is about to win, persuading him to pursue them, and with this to break his battle formation, giving them the opportunity to exploit this, and inflict heavy losses on them. It was 7 in the evening, which is more than 12 hours from the start of the battle (at dawn), and Louis the Child thought that his troops were about to win the battle. At this moment the Hungarians started a general attack, then again used the famous feigned retreat tactic of the nomadic warriors, starting to retreat in haste, like they were defeated. We do not know for sure why, but at this point the Germans were very sure that they had won the battle, and started a general attack on the retreating Hungarians, leaving their well-protected defensive lines, and breaking their battle formation in their rush to catch up to the Hungarians, who retreated in ordered lines, very careful to not disorganise their battle order. Plik:The second phase of the Battle of Lechfeld (910).jpg The second phase of the battle. Maybe they did not want to wait for another night, thinking that the Hungarians will shoot arrows on them all the night, destroying their camp, or they were tired by the unusual length of the battle (it lasted all day, from dawn to evening), in the hot summer sun, or they were traumatised by the ever-growing losses inflicted on them by the Hungarian arrows, or on the contrary the Hungarians, with their monotone, apparently unsuccessful attacks against their lines aroused in them a self-conceit that they are about to win the battle. Nevertheless, this shows that the Hungarians used again psychological warfare tactics, making the enemy troops to be frightened, or to lose their will to fight, or to be exaggeratedly self-conceited, which made them easier to defeat. The Hungarians also used psychological warfare in another battle that occurred 11 years earlier: the Battle of Brenta River, feigning defeat in an early skirmish, then running away, showing to the enemy commanders that they had despaired, then sending envoys to them asking for forgiveness, with this convincing the enemy to feel pretentious and comfortable, then striking in an unexpected moment and destroying the Italian army. During the whole battle of Augsburg, the Hungarians waited for this moment, hiding their reserve troops in woods that allowed huge numbers of soldiers to be concealed. The retreating main Hungarian army lured the attacking German cavalry to the places in which their reserve troops were hidden, and they continued to retreat until the whole pursuing German cavalry crossed the narrow field which separated two woods in which the Hungarian reserves were hidden, when suddenly without observing them, these hidden Hungarian reserves came out from their hiding places and attacked the Germans with loud screaming in order to frighten and demoralize them before the final clash. Plik:The third phase of the Battle of Lechfeld (910).jpg The third phase of the battle In this moment, the retreating Hungarian main troops turned back and attacked the Germans from the front, resisting their charge, and not letting them break their line. At that moment those Hungarian units who came from the rear and sides of the Swabians surrounded them completely, and entered into a final hand-to-hand fight with the hopeless enemy. This shows that before the battle, the Hungarian commander chose carefully a place near the initial battlefield, with two woods near to each other, in which he could hide some of his troops, which waited until the pursuing Germans passed them, and then attacked them. One of the key elements of nomadic warfare was the careful choosing of the battlefield, which provide them advantage in winning the battle. For nomads, one of the important elements in a battlefield were the places where they could hide some of their troops, and to lure the enemy there in order to encircle and destroy it. In the battle in point, the German camp and its surroundings were not adequate for hiding troops without being observed by the Swabians, so the Hungarian commander chose an adequate place away from the battlefield (the first battlefield), where he could hide some of his units (this being the second battlefield), and his main purpose during the battle was to lure the enemy to that place, which he succeeded after manoeuvres which lasted from the dawn until the evening, finally ending with success. This shows the great patience of the Hungarian commander, who in the whole day conducted manoeuvres which diverted the enemy's attention from his real purpose. The same thing happened also during the events which led to the Battle of the Brenta (899), this time against the Italians, a battle in which probably the Hungarians were led by the same commander. The fact that the Hungarian troops which performed the tactic of the feigned retreat, luring the German cavalry at the second battlefield, could withstand, in the decisive moment, the charge of the Swabian heavy cavalry, shows that the Hungarians had also troops with adequate armor and weapons to resist a charge from the most formidable heavy cavalry of those times. Their success was also facilitated by the fact that they retreated in order, when the Swabians lost theirs. This shows also that the Hungarian commander chose attentively which branches to use in the precise moments of the battle, and that he was totally at charge of his troops from the beginning until the end of the battle. From Liutprand's account ("the kings people") we can understand that the king was not among the pursuing German cavalry, so this is why he escaped. In this slaughter, because they could not break the Hungarian encirclement, probably no German cavalrymen survived, and presumably here was killed count Gozbert, the real commander of the army and Managolt, the count of Alemannia, who were leading the attack of the German cavalry. Plik:The last phase of the Battle of Lechfeld (910).jpg The last phase of the battle. At this point the king Louis the Child had to be among the infantry, which marched after the German cavalry from far behind, thinking that they won the battle, but when he arrived to the new battle scene, he saw that his bravest soldiers were slaughtered by the Hungarians, shortly before. From Liutprand of Cremona's account we can understand very well that he was not part of the slaughter of the cavalry, and he saw only the result of it a little later. He narrates his astonishment, despair at that moment, and the fact that he was totally fooled and misled by their clever tactics. The remaining German infantry troops started to run away in despair, trying to save their lives. Probably the bodyguard unit of the king, which was mounted, managed to save him, and take him away quickly from the battlefield, while the Hungarians were busy of slaughtering the running German infantry, which suffered very heavy losses, caused by the Hungarian horsemen, who because these were the rules of nomadic warfare (eliminate the beaten enemy and his commanders completely ), pursued them all the way, killing every one in their reach. Następstwa The king escaped, entering the nearest town with walls (probably Augsburg), but the Germans lost almost their entire army. The Hungarian losses were so light, that after just 10 days, on 22 June, they managed to annihilate, in the Battle of Rednitz, the other German army, the Frankish-Lorrainian-Bavarian one, which before the battle of Augsburg was expected to unite with the main army led by the king Louis the Child, and to fight together against the Hungarians, killing also the commanders of that army, among them Gebhard, Duke of Lorraine. So, the Hungarian army, with a "Napoleonean" tactic (István Bóna), cleverly managed to attack and beat these two armies separately. Plik:The Hungarian campaign in the East Frankish duchies of 910.jpg The Hungarian campaign of 910, which resulted the Hungarian victories from Augsburg and Rednitz. After these two battles the Hungarian army plundered and burned the German territories while nobody tried to fight them off again, retreating to the walled towns and castles, and waiting for them to turn back to Hungary. On their way back home, the Hungarians plundered the surroundings of Regensburg, burned Altaich and Osterhofen. Only the Bavarians managed to beat a minor plundering Hungarian unit at Neuching, but this did not changed the fact: the annihilation of much of Germany's military power and capability to withstand the Hungarian attacks. This is demonstrated by the fact that after these defeats, Louis IV the Child, the German king, together with the Swabian, Frankish, Bavarian and Saxonian princes, agreed to pay tribute to the Hungarians. However, Louis the Child didn't survive for long these battles, dying in 911, maybe caused by the trauma and humiliation of these defeats. His successor as German king, Conrad I of Germany (911–918), refused to pay any tribute to the Hungarians (however, the dukes of Bavaria and Swabia paid from 917 tribute to the Magyars, who helped their fight against the German kings ), and this caused frequent attacks on Germany made by the Hungarian nomadic armies (911, 913, 915, 917, 919, 924), which caused many defeats (Eresburg in 915, Püchen in 919), destruction (the burning of Bremen in 915, Basel in 917) and plunderings, and just a few successes (particularly in 913), which finally forced king Henry the Fowler in 924 to again start to pay tribute to the Hungarians, until 933, the Battle of Riade which ended the long (26 years) period of Hungarian military superiority and domination in Germany. However, the Hungarian raids in Germany continued until 955, their defeat in the second Battle of Lechfeld. 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